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IV

I.

RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS OMITS IMPORTANT FACTS
AND RELIES ON FACTS WHICH WERE NOT BEFORE THE CSC WHEN
IT DECIDED THIS CASE.
The Deputies' statement of facts in many instances omits important facts. The

Deputies cite the Court not to the record of the Career Service Council(CSC), but to a
statement of facts submitted by the Deputies to the District Court.
For example, while the position of shift supervisor was a ranked first line supervisor
position, it was not within the department generally as claimed by the Deputies. Resp. Br.
p. 3. The Deputies' Exhibit N, indicates that shift supervisors existed only in the Jail,
Warrants and Civil divisions of the department. R. 855. The Deputies allege that the shift
supervisor position was reclassified as a sergeant position. Resp. Br. 3,4. The Court of
Appeals reciting the facts in the light most favorable to the CSC decision indicates the shift
supervisor position was eliminated. Alexanderson. ^ 2. The CSC also found in paragraph 2
of its decision that the shift supervisor position was eliminated.
In the discussion ofjob related minimum qualifications (Resp. Br., p. 5), the Deputies
fail to distinguish between County Personnel Rules and Regulations, and Jail Policies and
Procedures.

The qualifications from Exhibit 1C, R. 911-913, are from County Job

Descriptions. Promotion procedures and shift supervisor experience were contained in the
Jail Policies and Procedures Manual, not County Personnel rules or job descriptions. R 834.
There also is no evidence that the shift supervisor experience requirement existed in any
other division of the Sheriffs department. Whether the jail sergeant promotion policies in
the Jail manual were in force before or after the elimination of the shift supervisor position

has been an issue raised by County since the CSC hearing. These Jail policies contradict
County Personnel Rules and Regulations or County approved minimum job qualifications.
The reference to the memorandum rescinding the Jail Policies and Procedures(Resp.
Br. 6.) was not in the CSC record since it happened in 1998 over a year after the CSC
decision. In fact, the entire Jail Policies and Procedures Manual was rescinded in 1998
because Utah County had constructed a new jail with a different operating philosophy.
It is true that as a result of a request of the Deputies' Association written examination
and oral interviews were not conducted in the 1991 and other promotions. R 908. The
record further fails to support that length of service including correctional experience or shift
supervisor experience was not considered. Resp. Br. 6.
Also not supported are the claims that three of the four individuals promoted did not
meet established minimum qualifications or other applicable advancement policies. Resp.
Br. 6. All who were promoted in 1991 were POST certified. Deputy Howard was POST
(Peace Officer Standards and Training) peace officer certified. Deputies Herkimer and Binks,
were POST corrections officer certified. All held current POST certifications. Sergeant
Binks completed peace officer certification in December of 1991, shortly before he was
promoted. Deputies Herkimer and Binks further held college degrees and had corrections
and shift supervisor experience. It was not certain whether Deputy Howard held a college
degree and he had not been a shift supervisor. Whether the deputies promoted held required
minimum qualifications, depends on a determination of whether the Jail Policies and
Procedures stated minimum qualifications for promotion to sergeant. The three promoted
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sergeants all met the minimum requirements contained in the Utah County Job Description
for jail sergeant.(Exhibit 1C) The Deputies further failed to point out that Dennis Howard
had been a corrections officer in the jail. Resp. Br. 7.
The Deputies assert Deputy Martin trained those promoted over him to the rank of
sergeant. The testimony in the record is that Deputy Martin advised only Sergeant Howard.
There would have been no reason for Deputy Martin to train Deputies Herkimer and Binks
who were both previously shift supervisors and had more shift supervisor experience than
Deputy Martin. There further is no evidence in the record that Deputy Martin trained
Sergeant Pientka, who was an administrative jail sergeant prior to the 1991 promotions.
The Deputies alleged informal complaints and alleged assurances that their concerns
would be addressed internally and that they would ultimately be promoted to the rank of
sergeant (Resp. Br. 9) are further not supported by the record. Only three conversations
between the Deputies and their supervisors are in the record, none of which promised
promotion or occurred within a limitation period. As none of the alleged conversations can
be placed within a limitation period, the Deputies could not rely upon these assurances and
did not so rely in not asserting their rights. The Deputies claim that eligibility requirements
fluctuated widely, however, the deputies were never prohibited from participating in a
sergeants promotion. Resp. Br. 10.
The Deputies further failed to quote Sheriff Bateman correctly regarding his statement
from December, 1996 that he would investigate this matter and if he was able to determine
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that their allegations were accurate that he would do what he could to make it right. Resp.
Br. 10, R. 710.
Further not in the record is the date the Deputies learned of the conversation of Mike
Morgan with a patrol lieutenant. This date was alleged for the first time by the Deputies in
briefing this matter before the District Court. Resp. Br. 10. This conversation concerned a
promotion to Deputy III in which the Deputies did not participate and is not relevant to this
matter. Resp. Br. 10, 11.
The December 30th, 1996 letter from Sheriff Bateman was not in the record when the
CSC made its decision. Resp. Br. 11. The Deputies also failed to point out that Sheriff
Bateman in his December 30th, 1996 letter also indicated that the Deputies had been given
consideration for their experience as shift supervisors. R.340. As is shown by Exhibit N, all
positions in the department were "ranked". R 855.
The reference to inconsistencies referred to in Sheriff Bateman's December 1996
letter refers to nothing more than differences in promotional processes from one process to
the next, i.e. whether testing was or was not implemented. However, Sheriff Bateman was
not given the opportunity to testify on this letter as it was not discussed or introduced at the
CSC hearing.
The Deputies cite that the CSC did not award attorney's fees in an attempt through
footnote 5 on page 14 of their brief to reserve the right to seek attorney's fees. However, the
CSC attorney's fees decision was not cross appealed by the Deputies and the Deputies have
lost the right to pursue attorney's fees.
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In reference to replacing Mr. Beuhring before the CSC entered findings, as a result
of the Deputies motion to dismiss the District Court remanded this matter to the CSC for
entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in October of 1997. The CSC requested the
parties to present proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and objections thereto
which the parties completed in May of 1998. Mr. Beuhring's term on the CSC expired June
30th of 1998. He was not replaced until some three months later in October of 1998, a year
after the case had been remanded. Why Mr. Beuhring did not adopt the findings of fact and
conclusions of law submitted by the Deputies months before he was replaced after his term
expired is unknown. If the facts are clear and uncontroverted and capable of supporting only
a finding in favor of the judgment, why did not the CSC enter the proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law submitted by the Deputies before Mr. Beuhring was replaced.
The Deputies also incorrectly claim credit for advising the CSC that it had erroneously
ruled that further review was de novo under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The
Deputies opposed County's Motion for Reconsideration which advised the CSC that the
Administrative Procedures Act did not apply.
The Deputies also referred to the affidavit of Mr Beuhringfiledwith the District Court
on September 8th, 2000 for a District Court hearing on which CSC order would be reviewed.
This affidavit was signed in July of 2000, held and not filed until shortly before the
September 12th, 2000 hearing. This affidavit is not relevant to the issues before this Court
and is an attempt to sway the court with inflammatory arguments. The District Court did not
rely on this affidavit nor was County given an adequate opportunity to respond to it. The
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court stated on September 12, 2000 that it would disregard the subsequent CSC orders and
review the June 1997 CSC ruling.
The September 12, 2000 minute entry was made after briefing and argument by the
parties on the issue of which CSC ruling was binding. After determining that the District
Court would review the June 1997 decision, all issues were briefed, including the timeliness
issue. The irony of the delay and procedural issues created by remand is that they arose
because the Deputies requested the court to dismiss the County's appeal so the CSC could
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Deputies also failed to point out that the final appealable order of the District
Court granting the Petition for Extraordinary Relief dismissed the Deputies' claims for
limitation of actions grounds and contained nothing else.
The Deputies statement of facts omits many important facts and relies on facts not
before the CSC.
II.

COUNTY HAS CORRECTLY FRAMED THE ISSUES BEFORE THE
COURT,
Though the Court on Certiorari usually reviews the decisions of the Court of Appeals,

in this case the Court should directly review the CSC decision for several reasons. This
matter comes before the Court as an extraordinary writ under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
65B. Regarding review of Rule 65B writs, the Court of Appeals has previously stated
This court looks at the administrative proceeding as if the petition were brought here
directly, even though technically it is the district court's decision that is being
appealed....Since the review performed by the district court under Rule 65B is a
review of the entire record, it is the same review that would have been afforded if the
matter were raised as a direct appeal....We give no deference to the district court's
6

initial appellate review since it was a review of the record which this court is just as
capable of reviewing as the district court. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818
P2d23, 26(Utah App. 1991): Alexanderson. If 7.
The Supreme Court should, because this matter is brought under Rule 65B, review
this matter under the same procedure as the Court of Appeals, exercising the same review
that would have been afforded if the matter were raised as a direct appeal, giving no
deference to the District Court or the Court of Appeals prior appellate review, as this Court
is just as capable of reviewing this case as the District Court and Court of Appeals.
Further, the Court of Appeals in several instances did not address County's arguments
in the body of the opinion, as for instance application of the Renn v. Utah State Board of
Pardons, 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995) gross and flagrant standard, remand and whether the
Deputies knew of their grievance in 1991. The Court rejected the arguments by stating it
would apply the Renn standard, referenced footnotes, or failed to address the arguments
altogether. As the Court of Appeals presented no reasoned argument in the body of the
opinion, County should not be required to frame the issues in light of the Court of Appeals
opinion.
III.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND REMAND ISSUES ARE APPELLATE
ISSUES AND ARE ADDRESSED IN LIGHT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION.
The Court certified three questions to be heard in this matter. First, was the gross and

flagrant abuse of discretion standard properly applied. Second, did the Deputies timely file
their grievance with the CSC, and third, should the case have been remanded by the Court
of Appeals to the District Court. The first and third issues are appellate issues which arose
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only because of the decision of the Court of Appeals and are addressed in light of the Court
of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals was the only court to apply the Renn standard
and the issue of remand arose at the Court of Appeals level. The first and third issues have
been argued and framed in terms of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
IV.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, COUNTY'S FAILURE TO FRAME THE ISSUES
IN LIGHT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION IS HARMLESS
ERROR AS THE COURT OF APPEAL'S DECISION SHOULD BE
REVERSED FOR THE SAME REASONS THE CAREER SERVICE
COUNCIL DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A. Standard of Review
Though the specific facts of this case will not recur in the future, this case will

determine the important question of whether the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion
standard is applied to all 65B(d)(2)(A) writs. The standard of review applied will determine
the outcome of future actions.
In Petitioner's Brief, pp. 14-21, County argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
applying the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard on the grounds that application
of the standard stated in Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995) is
limited to cases where appeal is prohibited by statute only if there is a gross and flagrant
abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted. The instant appeal
was provided for by statute and the Renn standard should not be applied in this case or others
for several reasons. The Renn standard is contrary to the clear abuse of discretion language
in the Rules 65B(d), prevents the Rule 65B(d)(4) review of whether the lower court regularly
pursued its authority which includes correct application of the law, the CSC is not a policy-
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making body entitled to deference, and application of the Renn standard in this case would
result in differing standards of review between municipal civil service commissions and
county career service councils.
The cases cited by the Deputies are distinguishable. State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918
(Utah App. 1998) and Dean v. Henroid. 1999 UT App 056, 975 P.2d 946 are cases where
appeal was prohibited by statute. Indian Village Trading Post Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367
(Utah Court of App. 1996) was decided on other grounds. The application of Renn to all rule
65B writs by the Court of Appeals has made the exception the rule. It is significant that the
Court of Appeals in upholding its application of the Renn standard to all extraordinary writs
cites to its own interpretations of Renn and not Renn itself.
It is clear that the paramount issue is to draw a line preventing a Rule 65B writ from
becoming a vehicle to circumvent appeals prohibited by statute. The Renn Court ruled that
only where the lower Court committed a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and
fundamental principles of fairness were flouted, would the Court review a matter if appeal
is statutorily prohibited.
The Court of Appeals determination that the Deputies did not know of their cause of
action until Sheriff Bateman's December 1996 letter is a gross and flagrant abuse of
discretion since the determination is based on an irrelevant factor, whether the shift
supervisor position was "ranked", which was improperly admitted by the CSC after this
matter was remanded for findings and conclusions which were never entered.
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Contrary to the Deputies assertions, County does not argue that the Court should
engage in de novo review. The Tolman case sets the correct standard of review for career
service council decisions, reviewing factual determinations under the clearly erroneous
standard and reviewing the application of the law for correctness. Pet. Br. p. 21, Tolman at
26.
Applying the Renn standard to all writs also results in constitutional violations which
are properly before this Court. Because the District Court first addressed and rejected
applying the Renn standard in this case, County requests the Court to uphold the District
Court's rejection of the application of the Renn standard in this instance on other
constitutional grounds. "An appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper
grounds, even though the trial court relied on some other ground." DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d
428, 444 (Utah 1995). The Court of Appeals application of the Renn standard to all Rule
65B writs violates due process, fundamental fairness, and access to the courts by preventing
litigants of notice and a fair hearing by being thoroughly apprized of the law to be applied
by the lower court and the reviewing court. Despite years in court the determinative, key
issue in this case, the 1991 minimum qualifications for jail sergeant and whether the
promoted deputies met these qualifications has not been decided by any court, prohibiting
County from having it's claims and defenses properly adjudicated on the merits according
to the facts and the law.
The Deputies arguments regarding the County's constitutional allegations are
misplaced. The County in no way contends that the State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)
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sliding scale standard of review is unconstitutional. Nor does the County argue that
deference to a trail court's findings of fact should in any way be disturbed or that de novo
review should be the only option for review of a lower court's decision or that applying an
abuse of discretion standard to a lower court's ruling violates due process or the open courts
provision. But making the Renn exception the rule does violate due process and the open
courts provisions.
The CSC's application of the law should be reviewed for correctness since the CSC
is a volunteer, lay body, the limitation of actions issue presents complex and novel issues,
and the CSC is interpreting Utah County Personnel Rules and Regulations. More deference
to a trial court's or agency determination of law may be granted in other settings such as an
administrative agency charged with enacting and enforcing rules. However, this is not the
case with a career service council which neither makes nor enforces rules.
If the Renn standard applies, it is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion to expand
a limitation period from three months to five years and to base that expansion on evidence
not in the CSC record. Further, because the key determination in this case has never been
made, fundamental issues of fairness have been flouted.
B. Limitation of Actions
The second issue certified is whether the Deputies timely filed their grievance.
Framed in reference to the Court of Appeals decision, it improperly concluded that the
Deputies first knew or should have know of their grievance in December, 1996.
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The Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled, as did the CSC, that the Deputies discussion
with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing and
that implicit in this determination is a factual finding that the Deputies were not reasonably
aware of their grievance until their December 1996 discussion with Sheriff Bateman.
Alexanderson, *| 9, 10. This finding is clearly erroneous for several reasons. First because
the Jail Policies and Procedures Manual Sections 150 and 127 did not set minimum
qualifications for jail sergeant. Pet. Br. pp. 22-34. Utah County argued below to the CSC
and the District Court that the Jail Policies and Procedures regarding testing for jail sergeant
and/or a minimum qualifications for jail sergeant did not override Personnel job description
minimum qualifications. The Deputies must reach to Jail Policies and Procedures and not
County Personnel Department Policies and Procedures to support their arguments. The
Deputies cannot establish their cause of action if Jail Policies and Procedures do not override
personnel job descriptions. The minimum qualifications for jail sergeant and whether the
promoted Deputies satisfied them are the key facts.
Second, the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action within the
limitation period after they were not hired. Pet. Br. pp. 34-41; 54-59. Even if this Court does
not determine the minimum qualifications for jail sergeant and assumes or finds that the Jail
Policies and Procedures set testing requirements and minimum qualifications, the Deputies
knew, should have known, and were on inquiry notice of their cause of action when they
were not promoted in 1991. The Court of Appeals statement of the facts, cited in the light
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most favorable to the CSC decision, states facts which determine that the Deputies were on
inquiry notice in 1991 and did nothing.
Because the duties of sergeant were similar to those of shift supervisor, and based on
representations made to them by management, the Deputies believed they would be
promoted to sergeant. Both Deputies requested to be considered for the sergeant
positions. In December 1991, the department made its hiring decisions and neither
deputy was promoted.
Although the Deputies were qualified for the sergeant position, some of those
who were promoted to sergeant as the Council later found, did not meet minimum
qualification requirements. The Deputies suspected that several of those promoted
were not qualified, but the Deputies claim they did not have access to sufficient
eligibility lists and did not at that time investigate further or pursue formal grievances.
Alexanderson, ^ 2,3.
The Deputies participated in promotion processes, knew who was promoted,
suspected individuals who were not qualified were promoted, and had access to all relevant
rules and regulations. It is clearly erroneous to find that the Deputies did not know or could
not have known of their grievance at the time of the 1991 promotions. As the Deputies
sought promotion, the key facts that put them on inquiry notice were that they were not
promoted and that they suspected that those who were promoted did not possess minimum
qualifications.
The Deputies do not argue if they knew or should have known of their cause of action
in 1991 because the facts are clear from their own statements that they knew or should have
known of their cause of action when they were not promoted in the 1991. (And subsequent
promotions if in fact the Jail Policies and Procedures applied after elimination of the shift
supervisor position. The Jail Policies and Procedures are clearly not applicable to any other
part of the department.) The defendants knew or should have known of their grievance when
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they were not promoted in 1991 and having failed to timely complain, the grievance that they
should have been promoted in 1991 is therefore barred.
Third, because Sheriff Bateman's letter containing the statement relied on by the
Court of Appeals for finding the deputies were not aware of their grievance until 1996 was
not in the record when the CSC made its June 1997 decision. Pet Br. p. 39, 41. The
statements in Sheriff Bateman's December 1996 letter, that shift supervisors were not
automatically promoted to sergeant because the position of shift supervisor was never a
ranked position, was not in the CSC record when the CSC decided this matter. Sheriff
Bateman's December 30th letter to the Deputies was not introduced into the record until June
of 1998. The CSC not even having considered the December 30th letter where the ranked
statement was made could not have had " . . . reason to believe the Deputies were not
reasonably aware of their employment grievance until December of 1996." Alexanderson,
T| 11. As the CSC ruled that the December 17,1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman drove the
time for filing and not his statement in the December 30, 1996 letter, the Court of Appeals
improperly upheld the CSC on other grounds not established in the record. Salt Lake County
v. Metro West Ready Mix. Inc. 2004 UT 23,1f 21.
Fourth, whether the Deputies were "ranked" is not relevant to the minimum
qualifications question or whether they should have been promoted. Pet. Br. p. 39, 41.
Whether shift supervisors were ranked is not a minimum qualification necessary foi
promotion to sergeant. There are no policies, rules or regulations that provide that whethei
they were "ranked" is a requirement for promotion to sergeant or that required promotion
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because shift supervisor was a ranked position. Learning whether the Sheriff considered the
Deputies as ranked is not an occurrence or an element of their cause of action. Even if being
ranked were relevant, it is at best the belated discovery of a legal theory long after their cause
of action lapsed. Pet. Br. p. 37.
Sheriff Bateman's misunderstanding regarding shift supervisors was harmless error
in light of the fact that in the same letter he indicates that the Deputies were given adequate
consideration for their experience as shift supervisors. R 340, 341. As can be seen from
Exhibit N, all positions in the department were ranked. Alexanderson, Tf 4. If whether the
Deputies were ranked is relevant, the appropriate remedy would be to set aside the
promotions giving the Deputies consideration as ranked deputies.
Fifth, the discovery of possible corruption unrelated to the Deputies would not give
rise to an actionable grievance for promotion or hiring processes they were not involved in.
Pet. Br. p. 38,39. The Court of Appeals relied on a discovery alleged to have occurred in
December 1996 of possible unfairness in a promotional process unrelated to the Deputies.
The date of this discovery is not in the CSC record and was alleged by the Deputies for the
first time when this matter was briefed before the District Court. This also amounts to
upholding the CSC on other grounds improperly in the record.
Sixth, the Court of Appeals intimates that the CSC could deviate from the three month
limitation of actions as a reasonable and rational departure from an agency's own rules.
Alexanderson, fn. 7. The Court of Appeals indicates that the CSC is a body charged with
hearing employment grievances, but then attributes to them rule-making authority similar to
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the Public Service Commission. Alexanderson,^j 5, fn. 7. This may be true were the CSC
a rule making agency subject to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Union Pacific R.R.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n 842 P.2d 876(Utah 1992)(upholding an agency interpretation of
its own rule with two plausible constructions), cited by the Court of Appeals, is a case
interpreting whether under UAPA an agency's action was contrary to it's own rule. The
Court of Appeals erroneously assumes that Section VII.E.l of the Utah County Office of
Personnel Management Rules and Regulations is a CSC rule. The 3 month limitation of
actions is promulgated by the County pursuant to the County Personnel Management Act and
is a County Personnel Department rule, not a CSC rule. The interpretation of the rule is not
at issue as the 3 month limitation does not give rise to differing constructions. It is the
application of a clear rule that is at issue in this case, not the interpretation of a rule with two
plausible constructions. The CSC has no authority to disregard County's three month
limitation of actions. Alexanderson, ^| 9. A deviation from three months to almost five years
is not slight as characterized by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals then relies on evidence not before the CSC (alleged
improprieties and Sheriff Batemans' letter) to determine that the departure was reasonable
and rational. The departure is not reasonable and rational as the Deputies knew or should
have known of their cause of action long before the 1991 discussion with Sheriff Bateman.
The fact that promotional procedures may have been arbitrary does not justify promotion of
complaining individuals. The only finding that could allow for promotion would be that the
Deputies were the only qualified deputies available for sergeant promotion in 1991.
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The Court of Appeals reliance on the CSC's finding that some employees were
promoted to the sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in the various
policies was stated in the context of promotions from 1991 through 1997. Unless the 'some5
includes the three deputies promoted to jail sergeant in 1991, this reliance is insufficient.
This statement was also made in the CSC decision in the context of relief under
implementation of standardized and unbiased testing, not retroactive reinstatement and
appropriate reparations.
The Court of Appeals decision would have been different if the proper standard of
review had been applied. Evidence in the record and contained in the factual statement of
the Court of Appeals shows that the Deputies were at least on inquiry notice and had a duty
of due diligence to investigate their claims and did nothing. The Deputies either knew or
should have known, of their cause of action long before their meeting with Sheriff Bateman
some five years later. County's marshaling shows that it is clearly erroneous to find that the
defendants first knew of their cause of action in December of 1996. The facts marshaled in
support of a determination that the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of
action when they were not promoted in 1991 come largely from their own statements and
arguments. The Court of Appeals and the Deputies completely avoided the question of
whether there was sufficient evidence in 1991 to find that the Deputies knew or should have
known of their cause of action. The Deputies clearly felt they were wronged and believed
they were the only Deputies qualified for promotion to jail sergeant in 1991. The Deputies
knew the key facts when they were not promoted in 1991, that someone else was promoted
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who they suspected did not meet minimum qualifications. Deputy Martin worked with
Deputy Howard in the jail and the Deputies were both acquainted with Deputies Herkimer
and Binks, who were their fellow shift supervisors. If the Deputies did not have actual
notice, they were certainly on inquiry notice and failed to exercise due diligence. At best
Sheriff Bateman's December 1996 letter is a belated discovery of a new legal theory that is
insufficient to recommence a lapsed limitation period. Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds
Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 579(Utah App. 1996).
The Deputies continue to advance that the promotional process was corrupt and
illegal, though no court to date has adopted this position. Neither the CSC, District Court
nor the Court of Appeals adopted these arguments. There is only one allegation of a
promotional irregularity, that of the unrelated and "unsuccessful" incident concerning a
patrol position. There is no evidence of any illegal conduct. There is no hint of corruption
or any illegality in any opinion issued by the lower courts despite the many and varied
allegations of the Deputies. The Court of Appeals decision and the CSC ruling do not
contain even a hint of concealment alleged by the Deputies. The record does not support the
alleged corruption, illegality or "affirmative measures of concealment" which the Deputies
allege.
The Sheriffs statement about "inconsistencies" is also not determinative and does
not form the basis of a cause of action. This phrase was used only in the context that
promotion procedures had varied between promotional processes and is not an admission of
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wrong doing. In any event, this evidence was not before the CSC when it made its ruling and
should not be considered by the Court in reviewing the Court of Appeals opinion.
If the Court determines that the Deputies knew or should have known of their cause
of action when they were not hired in 1991 and subsequent promotional processes, there is
no need to reach the County's arguments on the discovery rule. Pet. Br. p. 59-69. The
Deputies cannot show and do not argue that the County fraudulently concealed any key facts,
that there are exceptional circumstances excusing the Deputies' failure to file a grievance or
any circumstances which would allow the Deputies to rely on estoppel or any form of the
discovery rule.
Any delay in this case is squarely upon the Deputies who though on inquiry notice,
did not pursue their grievances for five years. There is no evidence of concealment of Sheriff
Bateman' s understanding regarding the shift supervisor being ranked or unranked or that this
understanding is even relevant to the promotion of the Deputies. There was no concealment
of the testing processes as the Deputies participated in the tests and knew the processes and
publishing eligibility lists would not be helpful to determine the qualifications of promoted
deputies as eligibility lists did not contain minimum qualifications. See eligibility roster
Exhibit 16. R 873, 874. The Deputies did not ask why they were not promoted and the
claimed repeated assurances are simply general allegations without any basis in fact.
C. Remand
The third issue, whether the case should have been remanded, concerns a decision first
made by the Court of Appeals, and the arguments are framed in light of that decision. The
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Court of Appeals should have remanded this matter because there was no appellate decision
on the merits of this case. The District Court Memorandum Decision addressed only testing
procedures, the remedy for a violation of which would be to repeat the testing and not
promote the complaining participants. The District Court however made no findings relevant
to the merits which would have supported a ruling promoting the Deputies to sergeant, that
deputies promoted to Jail Sergeants in 1991 did not meet minimum qualifications or other
issues on the merits raised by County below.
The only statement regarding qualifications made by the CSC in Part 3 of its June 30th,
1997 decision is "Evidence supported the fact that some employees were promoted to the
sergeant's rank that did not meet the qualifications outlined in the various policies". This
statement was made in the context of reviewing sergeants' promotions within and without
the jail from 1991 through 1996. This statement is too vague to support granting the
Deputies5 back pay and ordering immediate promotion. The only finding that would allow
those remedies would be that Bonnie Herkimer, Mark Binks, and Dennis Howard, promoted
in 1991 to jail sergeant, did not meet minimum qualifications. These facts have never been
addressed squarely by any court and the CSC finding is an insufficient finding on which to
promote the Deputies. It is also significant that this statement was made not in reference to
reinstatement or back pay, but to implementation of standardized unbiased testing. County
requests only that this case be remanded to the District Court on the merits to address the
minimum qualifications for j ail sergeant in 1991 and County's other unaddressed meritorious
arguments.
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The Deputies further confuse promotional processes repeatedly with minimum
qualifications. The remedy for defective promotional process would be to repeat the process
correctly, not promote the deputies who complained. Reliance on the CSC ruling that testing
procedures were inconsistent and involved subjective criteria is not relevant to the
determination of whether the Deputies should have been promoted in 1991. County admits
that the processes varied from one process to the next, having foregone competitive testing
at the request of the Deputies' Association. R 908. County does not wish to relitigate this
issue. However, the issue of minimum qualifications and the County's other arguments have
not been and should be addressed by the District Court. The question of whether Jail Policies
and Procedures can supercede County Personnel Rules and Regulations has not been and
should be addressed. This case should be remanded to the District Court for a decision on
the merits.
This case should also be remanded as the District Court's final order, which the
Deputies did not object to, dismisses the case on statute of limitations grounds only. The
District Court's discussion of merit principles was dicta unnecessary to its decision. Having
determined that the case is barred by the limitation of actions, there was no need to address
or comment on the merits of the case.
There was no need for the County to cross appeal the District Court's final order when
all the order did was dismiss the case for failure to timely file. The only issue before the
Court of Appeals was the limitation of actions determination. The order appealed from did
not contain any reference to the merits of this matter. There was nothing in the District
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Court's final order, based on limitation of actions grounds only, for the County to cross
appeal. County supposes at this juncture, if County had cross appealed the merits, the
Deputies would be arguing that the merits were not before the Court because the final order
did not address them. It is the final order of the District Court and not the Memorandum
Decision that is appealed. If the findings had been made in the body of the final order, they
would have been subject to cross appeal. This case should be remanded for review of the
merits on the record.
County is not requesting that this case be remanded to the CSC for factual findings.
If the Deputies5 grievance was timely, County's request for remand at page 50 of its Appeal
Brief in the Court of Appeals, footnote 3, is to remand this case to the District Court to
review the merits of the issues not addressed by the District Court as the District Court
clearly only reached promotion procedures and not minimum qualifications or County's other
meritorious arguments.
The Deputies' argue that if the case were remanded now, there would not be sufficient
evidence upon which any adjudicative body could make a ruling on the merits. This is an
admission by the Deputies that County suffered prejudice by the Deputies' delay in bringing
their grievances. The Deputies acknowledge that when this case was tried it had aged to the
point where it could not be properly determined by quoting Petitioners Brief pp. 65,66. At
the time this case was tried, the state of available evidence was indeed bleak. Resp. Br. p.
44. However, County is asking for remand for review on the record, not for taking further
evidence.
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The Court of Appeals failure to remand also results in constitutional violations argued
in Petitioner's Brief pp. 69-74. These arguments are properly before the Court as these
violations are appellate issues arising because the Court of Appeals did not remand this case.
V.

CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, the Court should determine that the Renn standard of review

is not applicable to this case. The Court should review this matter for an abuse of discretion,
reviewing the application of the law for correctness, employing a clearly erroneous standard
as to findings of fact. Applying this standard, the Court should determine that the Court of
Appeals erred when it determined that the Deputies did not learn of their cause of action until
1996, as the Deputies knew, should have known, and at the least were on inquiry notice when
they were not promoted in 1991.
In the alternative, should the Court employ the Renn standard, as the Court of Appeals
upheld the CSC on other grounds improperly in the record, the Court should determine that
it was a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion to find the Deputies grievance was timely by
relying on evidence not before the CSC.
Finally, should the court determine this matter was brought in a timely manner, this
matter should be remanded to the District Court for a decision on County's meritorious
arguments.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 2004.

M. Cort Griffin ^
Attorney for Petitioner
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